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• Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this 
publication are those of the authors. They do not 
purport to reflect the opinions or views of the 
Magazine.
• The manuscript shall be within the scope 
of At-TAHALOF Magazine under the theme of 
counter-terrorism, and shall be pertinent to 
one of the four key IMCTC domains: ideology, 
communications, counter-terrorist financing 
and military.
• The manuscript shall be authentic, objective 
and novel, and shall be of a sound methodolo-
gy, language and style.
• Research shall be well-referenced, sources 
shall be cited and a well-written list of refer-
ences and bibliographies shall be provided.
• The manuscript shall be written in Arabic, 
English or French.
• Under no circumstances may the manu-
script have been published by any formats 
even if minor or major changes are made.
• The manuscript either in whole or in part 
may not have been previously published or 
accepted for publication elsewhere wheth-
er by the same author or by a different au-
thor.
• The manuscript not accepted for publi-
cation does not mean such a manuscript is 
poor. Failure to obtain acceptance for such a 
manuscript may be due to technical or other 
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considerations; for instance, the subject-mat-
ter of such an article has been addressed. The 
author of such an article shall be informed ac-
cordingly.
• The Editorial Board shall be entitled to adabt 
the manuscript submitted – including modifi-
cation, editing, proofreading, tweaking, revis-
ing, conflation, truncation – without prejudice 
to the key ideas.
• A potential writer shall be entitled to repub-
lish his or her manuscript at his or her discre-
tion, provided that he or she shall expressly 
state that such a manuscript has already been 
published in At-TAHALOF Magazine.
• At-TAHALOF Magazine shall be entitled to re-
produce the manuscript in any formats, be it 
electronic or independent publications.
• At-TAHALOF Magazine shall be entitled to 
translate the manuscript into any language 
and republish such a manuscript in the lan-
guage(s) desired. 
• The manuscript shall be formatted, using 
Microsoft Word Processor in compliance with 
the following:
o Arabic: 
Font Type: Traditional Arabic; Font Size: 18
o English & French:
Font Type: Times New Roman; Font Size: 14
 Footnotes and sources, if any, should go at the 
end of the manuscript with font size (16) for 
Arabic and (12) for English and French.
• The Quranic verses of the Holy Quran shall be 
placed in parentheses and shall be appropri-
ately cited, using the Ottoman calligraphy, with 
reference to the relevant verse and chapter 
numbers.
• It shall be desirable to attach illustrations 
relevant to the subject-matter; such illustra-
tions shall be taken from specialized authen-
tic resources rather than from newspapers 
and magazines. 
• Attached to the manuscript shall be the au-
thor’s curriculum vitae (CV), including: full 
name, nationality, country of residence, spe-
cialization, current job position, scientific and 
cultural publications, e-mail address, bank ac-
count number and a recent photograph.
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PAKISTAN EXPERIENCE OF 
COUNTERTERRORISM
  By Ghanzanfar Ali Khan
 Pakistani journalist and writer.
Pakistan has made appreciable strides in its ability to gather and synthesize intelligence, track and target terrorist networks, and use direct action to eliminate terrorists and terror cells. It has also put in place a robust security architecture in coordination with the international community and protocols to deter terror threats. Of course, all these measures taken by Pakistan can be further improved to combat terrorism effectively, while addressing other security challenges. It can further strengthen and reform the counterterrorism bureaucracy as well as the policy-making process. At 






Pakistan’s experience in combating 
terrorism has been very diverse. 
Pakistan’s Action to Counter Ter-
rorism (PACT) concerning Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa has been developed 
jointly by the Government of Paki-
stan and the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It seeks 
to strengthen the processes related 
to pre-investigations, investigations, 
prosecutions, and adjudication of 
terrorism-related cases. The project 
also involves upgrading the skills and 
knowledge of law enforcement offi-
cials, prosecutors, and judges while 
promoting coordination between 
provincial and federal authorities as 
well as the National Counter Terror-
ism Authority (NACTA), Counter-Ter-
rorism Department (CTD) of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Police and Islamabad 
Capital Territory (ICT) Police.
Three other objectives include en-
hancing investigation processes and 
the use of forensic evidence by the 
KP Police Counter Terrorism Depart-
ment for the preparation of terrorism 
cases; strengthening the capacity of 
the KP Prosecution Directorate and 
Judiciary to prosecute and adjudi-
cate terrorist cases effectively, and; 
improve provincial and inter-provin-
cial coordination on counter-terror-
ism to strengthen overall capacity on 
counter terrorism-related strategic 
analysis. These measures will fur-
ther promote greater judicial integ-
rity and human rights compliance 
through judicial processes in terror-
ism cases.
Besides the measures being taken 
by Pakistan, one may not ignore the 
fact that a major reason for Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to 
confront the terror attacks is that 
both share borders with Iran and 
Afghanistan. On top of this, the infil-
tration of non-state actors inside the 
Pakistan border is easy because of 
the porous border areas of KPK and 
Balochistan. The merger of Federal-
ly Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa prov-
ince as per the 25the constitutional 
amendment, provided better law and 
order situation in KP. These efforts 
were further backed by the setting 
up of rehabilitation centers under 
the military in KP and the Peaceful 
Balochistan Package.
On top of that, a large number of for-
mer militants have been de-radical-
ized in rehabilitation centers under 
the military-led Sabawoon Project. 
These militants were taught Islamic 
courses and basic education cours-
es besides being given psychologi-
cal and psychiatric treatment. They 
were also given vocational training 
to make them productive members 
of society and to reintegrate them 
into the mainstream of society and 
the country at large. This was indeed 
a commendable initiative of the Paki-
stani government.
At another level, the Pakistan gov-
ernment formulated in January 2015 
its National Action Plan as part of 
a comprehensive strategy to crack 
down on terrorism. It was to be a 
major coordinated state retaliation 
against the deadly Peshawar school 
attack. It provided the framework for 
the 21st Amendment to the Consti-
tution of Pakistan which established 
speedy military trial courts for ter-
rorism-related offenses. It also led 
to the resumption of capital punish-
ment and mandatory re-verification 
through fingerprint recognition of all 
subscribers on cell phones.
The National Action Plan also author-
izes the foreign, finance, and other 
ministerial departments to reach out 
to the friendly Muslim countries to 
clamp down on financiers of sectar-
ian and terrorist networks operating 
against Pakistan. This is where Pa-
kistan can convert a challenge into 
an opportunity for growth by capital-
izing on its youth population, which 
constitutes around 60 percent of the 
total population. Currently, Pakistani 
youth face some serious issues, in-
cluding poverty, low literacy rate (es-
timated to be 53 percent for males 
and 42 percent for females), while 15 
percent of the youth are unemployed, 
making them vulnerable to terror, 
drug abuse and other vices. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) has been work-
ing in Pakistan for over 35 years in 
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close collaboration with the Govern-
ment of Pakistan and civil society for 
addressing development challenges, 
specifically related to drug abuse and 
other types of crime. Together with 
the government, the UNODC has de-
veloped its second Country Program 
to ensure that its support is direct-
ed towards strategic priorities and 
meets Pakistan’s national needs. The 
second Country Program (CPII) draws 
on the experience of its predecessor 
(CPI) and aims to bolster the efforts 
of Pakistan in enforcing the rule of 
law.
To this end, the government of Pa-
kistan and the UNODC have jointly 
agreed to promote peace and sta-
bility, complement government pol-
icies and programs, assist Pakistan 
in achieving international commit-
ments, and implement UNODC man-
dates. The development process 
has been built around mapping pro-
grams, strategic consultations with 
donors and baseline assessments. 
CPII is a dynamic framework that can 
be adapted as it is implemented ac-
cording to Pakistan’s changing needs 
and priorities.
UNODC understands the particular 
challenges related to governance, 
security and public health in Paki-
stan. Accordingly, it is collaborating 
with the Government of Pakistan to 
counter these challenges effectively. 
The long-term objective of the UN-
ODC is to expand the capacity of the 
Pakistani government to address 
long-term goals and maintain a high 
level of technical capacity. To this 
end, UNODC is focused on three in-
terdependent domains: 1) illicit traf-
ficking and border management; 2) 
criminal justice and legal reforms; 3) 
drug demand reduction, prevention 
and treatment; and two additional 
cross-cutting themes: e-Learning; 
and research and analysis. These 
efforts across the social and print 
media as well as intranet are bearing 
fruit, says UNODC on its website.
Let us look at the other faces and 
facets of terrorism in Pakistan. An 
attack on an army-run school in 
Peshawar on December 16, 2014, 
which killed 150 children, claimed 
by Tehreek-e-Taliban was a turning 
point in the history of terrorism in Pa-
kistan. This led to the unveiling of a 
new counter-terrorism strategy, the 
20-point National Action Plan, by the 
then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. 
But six months later, amid continued 
terror attacks, the NAP looked like a 
hastily-conceived strategy for public 
consumption during a moment of cri-
sis than a strong robust plan. It was 
also felt that there is a deep discon-
nect between the state and the soci-
ety due to which anti-state elements 
are finding space to operate. It was 
then suggested that every district of 
Pakistan should have its anti-terror-
ist unit.
If we look at the timeline, then Pa-
kistan suffered numerous terrorist 
threats in 2017, but these threats 
decreased later in subsequent years. 
These attacks were more destructive 
showing the complicity of several ter-
ror groups, who used different meth-
ods to attack targets. On February 16, 
2017, a suicide bomber killed about 
88 people and injured more than 
300 people at the Sufi shrine of Lal 
Shahbaz Qalandar in Sindh Province. 
In fact, a series of terrorist attacks 
took place in Pakistan since 1979, 
when the Soviet Union occupied Af-
ghanistan. According to the South 
Asian Terrorism Portal Index, the ter-
ror attacks in Pakistan decreased by 
89 percent in 2017 since its peak in 
2009.
Another important component of 
Pakistan’s experience in combating 
terrorism is its partnership with the 
US-led coalition. This alliance helped 
Pakistan to be positioned as a front-
line state in curbing the menace of 
terrorism, while it also became a 
beneficiary of economic and military 
assistance. It also succeeded to re-
store Pakistani membership in the 
Commonwealth, which was suspend-
ed after the military coup of October 
1999. But, Pakistan also paid a heavy 
price while working in the global war 
on terror. Pakistan suffered irrep-
arable losses because of the terror 
attacks. According to a book titled 
‘Growth and Inequality—Agenda for 
Reforms’ authored by renowned 
economist Dr. Hafiz Pasha, Pakistan 
has suffered a substantial loss of 
$252 billion because of the US “war 
against terrorism”. This amount is 
eight times higher than the financial 
help provided by the United States to 
Pakistan.
Major terrorist groups operating in 
Pakistan included the Tehrik-e-Tal-
iban Pakistan (TTP), Jamaat-ul-Ah-
rar, and the sectarian group Lash-
kar-i-Jhangvi al-Alami (LJA). Islamic 
State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) 
also claimed many attacks against 
Pakistani targets, some of which may 
have been conducted in collaboration 
with other terrorist outfits. Then there 
are groups located in Pakistan, like 
the Haqqani Network (HQN), Lashkar 
e-Tayyiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Moham-
mad (JeM), whose roles need to be 
discussed and debated.
These terrorist groups employed dif-
ferent methods to attack government 
institutions, academic institutions, 
markets, places of worship and even 
individuals. They used suicide bomb-
ings, rocket-propelled grenades, 
and vehicle-borne improvised ex-
plosive devices. On the other hand, 
the Pakistan government continued 
to strengthen its legislation, law en-
forcement and border security in a 
bid to foil terror attacks and to punish 
the perpetrators behind the attacks. 
The Pakistani government continued 
to implement the Antiterrorism Act 
(ATA) of 1997, the National Counter-
terrorism Authority Act (NACTA), the 
2014 Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 
and 2014 amendments to the ATA, all 
of which allow more powers to Paki-
stani government agencies to combat 
terrorism.
The law allows for preventive arrest, 
permits the death penalty for terror-
ists, and creates special Anti-Terror-
ism Courts for trial. The government 
also renewed for two more years a 
constitutional amendment allowing 
military courts to try civilians on the 
charges of terrorism. These efforts 
were backed by military, paramilitary, 
and civilian security forces, who con-
ducted counterterrorism operations 
all over the country. The Intelligence 
Bureau in Pakistan has nationwide 
jurisdiction and is empowered to co-
ordinate with provincial counterter-
rorism agencies.
On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Interior in Pakistan has more than 





operating under its jurisdiction. The 
National Counter Terrorism Authori-
ty acts as a nodal point for coordina-
tion purposes. Pakistan has also put 
in place several other measures to 
combat terrorism. It collects biomet-
ric information at land crossings with 
its International Border Management 
Security System. It’s National Action 
Plan to combat terrorism includes 
efforts to curb terror financing by 
boosting interagency coordination.
The government of Pakistan has not 
only been playing a leading role in 
hunting down Al-Qaeda operatives 
and their supporters, but also dealt 
strongly with the sectarian terror-
ist groups that have been involved 
in terrorism inside Pakistan. The 
two leaders of the dreadful Lash-
kar-e-Jhangvi, Riaz Basra, and Asif 
Ramzi, were killed in 2002, and many 
other individuals associated with 
this organization have either been 
killed in police encounters or are 
languishing in jails across the coun-
try. The Pakistani government took 
strong measures against such ter-
rorist groups, who were threats to 
the internal peace and security of the 
country.
Lately, there have been some reports 
and indicators showing the improved 
security situation across the country. 
According to a report of Pakistan In-
stitute for Peace Studies’ (PIPS), over 
the decade terrorist activities in Pa-
kistan have plummeted by more than 
85 percent. This could be attributed 
to the determination and resilience 
of the Government of Pakistan in 
fighting against the menace of ter-
rorism. It revised its foreign policy in 
Afghanistan. Pakistan also suffered 
diplomacy setbacks while supporting 
the freedom struggle of Kashmir. It 
also faced challenges from its civil-
ian population while its economy re-
mained weak and fragile. Therefore, 
it can be argued that Pakistan has 
been more or less a loser in the glob-
al terror coalition that evolved since 
9/11.
In the regional context, the growing 
Indian influence in Afghanistan is a 
serious setback for Pakistan’s for-
eign policy. The growing relations 
between India and Afghanistan and 
the Indian involvement in Afghani-
stan with the opening of four consu-
lates have serious implications for 
Pakistan’s security. For Pakistan, it 
presented the possibility of conflict 
operations being conducted inside 
Pakistan from its western border. The 
new Indo-Afghan engagements in the 
post-September 11 have been a ma-
jor point of conflict between Pakistan 
and India. The spirit of cooperation on 
the regional level—especially among 
Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan—is 
completely missing. A case in point 
is the refusal of Afghanistan to hand 
over Aslam Farooqi, the leader of 
the terrorist outfit Daesh’s splinter 
group, Khorasan Province (ISKP), “for 
further investigations” to Pakistan in 
early April.
But it is important to note that Pa-
kistan is moving from strength to 
strength in combating terrorism de-
spite several handicaps. Pakistan’s 
National Action Plan has been de-
vised to dismantle and prosecute 
terrorists and terror networks, and 
it stood the test of time. Strong mil-
itary operations like the Operations 
Zarb-e-Azab and Rad-ul-Fasaad gave 
added strength and credibility to the 
NAP in curbing the menace of terror-
ism. Mr. Antonio Guterres, UN Sec-
retary-General, recently spoke high 
about Pakistan and its efforts to com-
bat terrorism, and said that Pakistan 
has moved “from terrorism state to 
tourism state.” He called for the need 
to recognize and commend the role 
of Pakistan at the international level. 
This is a moment of pride for Paki-
stan, but it still needs to keep its belt 
tightened to eradicate the menace of 
terrorism once and for all.
The terror menace is not yet fully 
over. It is evident from the monthly 
security review of Pakistan Institute 
for Peace Studies’ (PIPS), which says 
that about 21 terrorist attacks took 
place in Pakistan during the first 
month of 2020. These were mostly 
low-intensity attacks confined to the 
province of Balochistan and KPK. 
Most recent attacks in 2020 were 
carried out by militant groups includ-
ing the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP), Hizbul Ahrar, Jamaatul Ahrar, 
local Taliban, and the Islamic State 
(IS) terrorist groups.
Terrorism in Pakistan still poses a 
significant threat to the people and 
the economy of the country. But, Pa-
kistan is more prepared today to deal 
with any crisis than it was a decade 
ago. After more than two decades 
of relentless fighting against terror-
ism, real success for Pakistan needs 
to be measured by foiling an immi-
nent terror attack. Therefore, it is 
the need of the hour to identify the 
terrorist groups that pose threats to 
its citizens and country at large. The 
Pakistan armed forces, particular-
ly the Special Services Group (SSG) 
commandos, possess extraordinary 
talent in counter-terrorism opera-
tions, acquiring the knack to elimi-











The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the largest military alliance. With a backdrop of terrorism rampant almost everywhere, NATO had no choice other than to tackle the threat of terrorism as member states and the rest of the world followed suit. Given the military nature of NATO, counterterrorism per se is subsumed under asymmetric warfare. The military power of the warring parties varies greatly, and their strategies and methods are never the same, as is the case of the national armies, rebel movements, and armed terrorist groups. However, NATO was not established for this purpose; its strategy and mandate do 
not include fighting armed groups or rebel movements. NATO should have been adapted to the requirements of the war 




In 2001, NATO experienced a stra-
tegic transformation in address-
ing terrorism. Prior to that date, 
terrorism for NATO was of a sec-
ondary priority with limited im-
pact. However, terrorism later has 
turned into a high security priority, 
and NATO has considered it a di-
rect threat to the citizens of NATO 
countries, and to international sta-
bility and prosperity. Therefore, 
NATO presented its strategic vision 
for the war on terrorism in 2010. 
Two years later, NATO presented 
the guiding principles of counter-
terrorism policies. In 2016, NATO 
established a joint intelligence di-
vision on terrorism and potential 
threats to the member states.
Throughout this period, NATO 
grew more aware of the preven-
tive measures against terrorism. 
In 2016, for example, it adopted 
the concept of “targeting stabil-
ity” through military support to 
neighboring countries, while en-
abling partner countries to coun-
ter terrorism on their own. In the 
same vein, NATO Secretary-Gen-
eral Jens Stoltenberg remarks: “In 
the long run, it is better to counter 
terrorism and achieve stability by 
training troops and building local 
security institutions, rather than 
deploying large numbers of NATO 
forces in combat operations.” To 
this end, NATO has begun send-
ing training teams to Iraq, Jordan, 
Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and 
Tunisia since 2017.
 Strategy Themes 
NATO counterterrorism strategy 
depends on three main themes: 
fostering awareness of the terror-
ist threat, building and developing 
NATO counterterrorism capabil-
ities and enhancing cooperation 
and engagement with states and 
international actors.
1. Fostering Awareness of Ter-
rorist Threat
NATO supports fostering mu-
tual awareness of the terrorist 
threat by adopting consultations, 
promoting intelligence sharing, 
strategic analyses and continued 
assessment. NATO intelligence 
reports are based on the contribu-
tions of the internal, external, civil 
and military intelligence services 
of the member states. NATO has 
gradually developed the methods 
and techniques to best deal with 
sensitive information, based on 
the decisions made at the suc-
cessive summits and the ongoing 
reform of intelligence structures 
since 2010.
Since the creation of NATO Joint 
Intelligence Division for Terror-
ism, strategic analytical reports 
on terrorism have been issued 
and related to other cross-border 
threats. In addition to the daily 
NATO consultations, experts from 
various disciplines are invited to 
brief member states on specific 
areas of counterterrorism. Equal-
ly important, the discussions with 
international organizations such 
as the United Nations (UN), the 
European Union (EU), the Organ-
ization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE), the Global 





strengthen the NATO knowledge of 
counter-terrorism efforts world-
wide and further help enhance its 
contribution to the global efforts.
NATO established the Center of Ex-
cellence for Defense Against Ter-
rorism (COE-DAT) in 2003 to provide 
training and education experiences 
at the strategic and operational lev-
els in counterterrorism, help verify 
and validate NATO concepts related 
to terrorism and develop and unify 
its ideology towards terrorism. The 
Center cooperates with more than 
120 international and institution-
al organizations around the world, 
and has presented more than 180 
activities, including courses, work-
shops, seminars and conferences 
in which nearly eleven thousand 
participants from 105 countries 
participated, conducted by 2150 
speakers, specialists, experts and 
practitioners from more than 60 
countries. The Center publishes a 
refereed journal “DATR”, which pub-
lishes scientific papers and articles 
for distinguished researchers.
2. Building and Developing NATO 
Capabilities
NATO seeks to ensure that it has 
advanced capabilities to prevent 
and respond to terrorist threats 
using Defence Against Terrorism 
Programme of Work (DAT-POW), 
which aims to develop new and 
evolving technologies and capa-
bilities to protect military, civil-
ian, infrastructure and ports from 
terrorist attacks, and to prevent 
non-conventional operations such 
as suicide attacks with improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), missile 
attacks on aircraft and helicop-
ters, attacks using chemical, bi-
ological or radiological materi-
als and conventional explosions. 
The program was then developed 
through the Conference of Nation-
al Armaments Directors (CNAD) of 
the NATO countries in 2004, and its 
work has since been expanded to 
include training, experiences and 
the development of models and 
concepts. 
The activities in this area, as well 
as the defense against terrorism 
program, include direct support 
for operations, such as the Active 
Endeavor in the Mediterranean 
Sea, which was one of eight initi-
atives launched in response to the 
9/11 Attacks, 2001. NATO gained 
unparalleled experience in de-
terring maritime terrorist activi-
ty in the Mediterranean Sea, the 
International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) operation in Afghani-
stan between 2001 and 2014 and 
the KFOR Operation, which began 
in 1999 to deploy security in the 
province of Kosovo.
NATO also seeks to strengthen 
its capabilities in combating the 
abuse of technology by terror-
ist groups. In light of the terrorist 
continued pursuit of using modern 
technologies in their operations, 
the terrorists’ use of unmanned 
aircraft or drones is the most se-
vere threat. Given the wide spread 
of such drones and the ease of 
manufacturing and operating such 
weaponizing technologies and 
their notoriously different uses, 
NATO defense ministers agreed 
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in February 2019 on a practical 
framework to counter unmanned 
air systems (UAS).
3. Cooperation with Partners
It stands to reason that a vital re-
sponse to terrorism requires a 
multi-pronged approach that uses 
political, diplomatic, judicial, se-
curity, intelligence, economic, fi-
nancial and military tools along 
with development assistance. The 
guiding principles of NATO coun-
terterrorism policies, which were 
endorsed by NATO heads of state 
in 2012, recognize this fact, high-
lighting communication with part-
ners and international organiza-
tions to consult, analyze terrorist 
threats and develop appropriate 
capabilities and cooperation activ-
ities across the civil and military 
fields.
Consultation and exchange of in-
formation are among the most 
critically important areas of coop-
eration that NATO seeks to develop 
and ensure mutual awareness of 
terrorist threats between the allies 
and partners, while enabling them 
to prepare to prevent and respond 
to terrorist attacks. The scope 
of cooperation with partners in-
cludes training and education. The 
activities offered by NATO include 
e-learning, distance courses, co-
operation with its centers of excel-
lence, workshops, training cours-
es, exchange of lessons learned 
and best practices.
In scientific and technical coopera-
tion, the activities provided by NATO 
to the partners include emergency 
preparedness and risk manage-
ment. Among the most important 
NATO programs is the Science for 
Peace and Security (SPS) program, 
which encourages dialogue and co-
operation between member states 
and partner countries in scientific 
research, technical innovation and 
knowledge exchange, and provides 
funding, specialized consultation 
and security support for scientific 
activities. Over the past five years, 
the program has initiated over 450 
cooperative activities between 29 
member states and 41 partner 
countries, including electronic de-
fense in Jordan, and demining in 
Ukraine. Another program in this 
area is NATO Science and Technol-
ogy Program (STO), which provides 
innovation, consultation and scien-
tific solutions to meet NATO needs 
to meet current and future security 
challenges. It is the largest col-
laborative research forum in the 
world in defense and security, with 
more than five thousand scientists 
in robust engagement. It benefits 
from the experiences of more than 
two hundred thousand people with 
more than three hundred projects.
 Strategy-Related Challenges
NATO counterterrorism strategy 
faces many challenges, some are 
“political” while others are “oper-
ational,”. The political challenges 
reveal that the terrorist threat and 
political response are not per-
ceived in the same way by all NATO 
member states. Three main differ-
ences can be shown between NATO 
state members:
1. Different efforts that NATO 
should make in countering ter-
rorism
There are countries that support a 
major counterterrorism action by 
NATO, such as the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom, 
Turkey and Denmark. While other 
countries such as France and Ger-
many see this responsibility as the 
sole responsibility of the member 
states, simply because NATO does 
not have sufficient counterterror-
ism tools; NATO should not seek to 
make a great effort in this regard, 
and the countries should take the 
initiative. 
2. Different effective counterter-
rorism methods 
While European countries adopt 
the soft means that prioritize dip-
lomatic, legal, judicial, social, eco-
nomic and cultural approaches to 
address the root causes of terror-
ism, the United States of America 
gives the military approach the 
highest priority.
3. Different assessment priorities
Some NATO countries, especial-
ly the Baltic and North countries, 
see that the Russian threat on the 
eastern side is the most important, 
while other countries, especial-
ly the countries of the South, are 
preoccupied with instability in the 
MENA region and the consequenc-
es of immigration.
Undoubtedly, these differences in 
setting priorities hinder consensus 
on political options in the face of 
terrorism. Dr. Juliette Bird, Head of 
the NATO Anti-Terrorism Division 
(2011-2019) remarks: “Working 
continuously with many countries, 
each of which is based on its do-
mestic and international priorities 
and interests, is often difficult. It 
means dealing with ever-chang-
ing levels of ambition, resources, 
interest and willingness to use 
NATO.”
The nature of NATO itself is a chal-
lenge in its war on terrorism, as 
it is a military alliance, the role of 
which remains supportive, rath-





non-military security challenges to 
terrorism. For instance, the rela-
tionship between organized crime, 
drug trafficking and terrorism 
has become more interconnected, 
making it more possible for ter-
rorist groups to access financing 
and weapons, while enhancing 
their capabilities. This has be-
come a serious security concern 
for NATO member countries and 
partner countries in the Western 
Balkans, around the Black Sea, and 
in the MENA. However, NATO can-
not directly address this security 
challenge, it only increases control 
of sea routes across the Mediter-
ranean Sea, collects intelligence, 
monitors the activities of non-state 
actors in non-governing regions, 
and provides early warning of 
criminal operations when neces-
sary, in close cooperation with na-
tional authorities, while also inter-
cepting smuggled goods.
 Peacemaking Operations 
NATO officials are fully aware 
that countering terrorism is not 
a key mandate for them; howev-
er, they recognize that NATO is 
tasked and entrusted with three 
mandates: collective defense, cri-
sis management and cooperative 
security. They also understand, in 
light of the experiences of the past 
two decades, that the root caus-
es of terrorism are political, eco-
nomic, social, demographic and 
environmental, and that NATO is 
not equipped and prepared to ad-
dress such issues; therefore, NATO 
member states have chosen to pay 
attention to peace-making opera-
tions, creating stability in conflict 
areas and assisting in building lo-
cal capacities. 
NATO has gone to great lengths 
in the war on terrorism, adopting 
a military concept in 2002, policy 
guidelines in 2012 and an action 
plan in 2014, and established a 
terrorist intelligence cell in 2017. 
Still, NATO is required to go further 
than that by strengthening its abil-
ities and capabilities to read and 
interpret signs of early warning, 
avoid surprises, such as those that 
resulted from political, econom-
ic and social conditions in Syria 
and Iraq, which brought about the 
emergence and control of ISIS.
NATO needs to learn lessons from 
the campaigns launched in the 
past. In Iraq, the military campaign 
led by the United States of America 
to topple the regime of President 
Saddam Hussein was marred by 
the lack of post-conflict planning. 
In Afghanistan, NATO military plan-
ning included cooperation between 
civilians and military personnel 
in aid and relief programs for the 
local population; however, the suc-
cesses of the local reconstruction 
teams cannot compensate for the 
failure of international bodies and 
countries to strengthen govern-
ance and development there. NATO 
should avoid getting involved in 
military actions without proper 
planning after such interventions 





  Mor Loume
Perhaps terrorism per se has become one of the key challenges to spreading peace and security, and building statehood 
and administration throughout Africa. In the recent five years, Africa has sustained an unprecedented rise of terrorist 
groups, according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2014. Over the past few years, the African Sahel Region has suf-
fered many security threats because of the increasingly growing problems, which demonized the region infested with a 
spate of extremist activities and terrorist acts, placing Senegal on full alert.
Insecurity and the snowballing influence of extremist groups place a heavy burden on the governments of Africa, as 
Africa is expected to be the new arena for the war on terrorism, especially after a large number of foreign fighters 
have sneaked in through the backdoor. In February 2020, the African Union in Addis Ababa announced that preparation 
was being made to deploy 3,000 soldiers temporarily along the Sahel Region, where eight years ago, regional forces 
confronted the bloody attacks of extremists. The Union affirmed that this helps to deter terrorist groups, in cooperation 
with the countries of the G5 Sahel and the Economic Community of West African States of which Senegal is a member state.





 Escalation of Terrorism in West Africa
West Africa includes 15 countries: Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, 
Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, 
Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Ivory Coast. All of 
these countries except Mauritania are members of the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
According to the United Nations, the rate of terrorist attacks on 
civilian and military targets has increased in recent years. Ter-
rorist attacks have increased five times in Burkina Faso, Mali, 
and Niger since 2016 with at least 4,000 deaths in the coun-
tries of the region last year, compared to 770 deaths in 2016. 
A research study issued by the Egyptian Center for Thought 
and Strategic Studies reported a noticeable increase in the 
activities of terrorist groups in 2019, as the continent was ex-
posed to approximately 3471 terrorist acts, causing 10,460 
deaths. Such a formidably terrifying activity of terrorist groups 
is associated with their new pathways. Given the decline in 
their activities in the Middle East, the rapid strategic transition 
to Africa was deemed necessary. As such, Senegal always em-
phasizes that the African countries have become the biggest 
victims of terrorism, rolling up their sleeves to raise global 
awareness of the necessity of coordination to decisively ad-
dress and counter terrorism.
 Examples of Counterterrorism Efforts in Senegal
The Senegalese Ministry of the Interior, in cooperation with Is-
lamic societies and the Sufi orders in the country, has held a 
number of events and activities to educate and sensitize the 
Senegalese people on tolerance and peace in true Islam, while 
exposing and stripping off what is unfairly attached to Islam, 
such as extremism and violence. Islamic societies held semi-
nars in universities and conference halls to educate youth and 
hamper their recruitment for the benefit of extremism. Among 
such constructive seminars was the “Threat of Terrorism 
Against the Individual and Community” attended by a wealth of 
counterterrorism scholars and pundits, delivered by Professor 
Omar Diallo, who paid a visit to the Prince Mohammed bin Naif 
Counseling Center in Riyadh.
Given the magnitude of the terrorist exploitation of the various 
media outlets to influence local and international public opin-
ion, the Society for Preachers of Peace and Development held 
a forum on “Media-Based Terrorism” supported by the Sen-
egalese government, which highlighted key foci on the chal-
lenges to journalists and the media, such as: How should the 
media address terrorism? Do the media serve public opinion 
or do they serve terrorists when monitoring terrorist acts? 
How can the media determine when an act or incident should 
be monitored? When should the media boycott and ignore? If it 
is decided to monitor a piece of news, which method(s) should 
first address it? What aspects should be highlighted? 
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What aspects should be ignored? 
When should the press and the media 
be committed not to publish informa-
tion and news that, if published, could 
lead to dire consequences? Senegal 
has identified methods to combat the 
spread of terrorism, and developed 
strategic steps within a holistic ap-
proach to combat violent extremism 
and terrorism, including good govern-
ance, tightening up security, uphold-
ing human rights, enhancing youth 
employment, eradicating poverty and 
spreading moderate thought.
 Senegal Relentless Action and 
Shouldering Responsibility
Inasmuch as the terrorist threat is 
increasingly snowballing, Senegal 
has made concerted efforts at all 
levels in close cooperation with its 
international partners across Africa, 
France, the United States of Ameri-
ca and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
with a view to combating terrorist 
networks in Africa. As Senegal is 
within the immediate vicinity of the 
countries most impacted by terror-
ism, its neighbor, Mauritania, called 
for the necessity of establishing a 
broad international and regional co-
alition to eliminate violence and ter-
rorism, especially in the countries of 
the 5G Sahel. Within the framework 
of cooperation between the two 
countries, they agreed, during the 
visit of the Senegalese President to 
Mauritania in February 2020, to sup-
port their rapprochement to prevent 
and combat transnational organ-
ized crime, especially terrorism and 
arms trafficking.
One manifestation of Senegal re-
lentless and vigorous pursuit to 
strengthen international cooperation 
in the fight against terrorism is the 
establishment of the third Interna-
tional Forum for Peace and Security 
in Africa in Dakar, Senegal, dated De-
cember 5 and 6, 2016. Senegal has 
demonstrated its unwavering com-
mitment to the necessity of concert-
ed international efforts to confront 
and eradicate terrorism; to dry up 
its sources of financing; to promote 
peaceful coexistence in communi-
ties; to achieve security and stability 
in Africa. To this end, Senegal pre-
sented a model for peacekeeping 
and security-building in the Dakar 
Sixth International Forum for Peace 
and Security in Africa in 2019, which 
is a forum that Senegal organizes 
annually with the participation of 
large countries to benefit from their 
experiences, such as the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, the United States of 
America, France and robust engage-
ment by the African countries.
The key theme featured by the forum 
is “Peace and Security in Africa: The 
Current Challenges of Pluralism.” 
The Forum issued conclusions and 
recommendations in the interest of 
peace and security in Africa, arriv-
ing at decisions to solve the securi-
ty problems recently witnessed by 
some African countries. The Dakar 
International Forum on Security and 
Peace is a Senegalese initiative that 
aims to establish peace and securi-
ty throughout Africa, and opens new 
horizons for African governments to 
confront those seeking to undermine 
the African security. 
 Domestic Strategies
Many security analysts believe that 
Africa has become one of the most 
notorious hotbeds of security unrest 
and threats in the world. Its geopol-
itics makes it a breeding ground for 
cross-continent terrorism, forcing 
Senegal to adopt a number of stra-
tegic plans to reduce the increased 
risk from flashpoints. In December 
2017, Senegal began the trial of 30 
people for violence, affiliation with a 
criminal group in connection with a 
terrorist group, money laundering, 
and terrorist financing. They were 
accused of joining Islamic militant 
groups in Senegal, a country that is 
still immune from any attacks by ex-
tremists other than its neighbors. 
Senegal realizes that the responsi-
bility of pundits is great. Therefore, 
the domestic strategy has achieved 
the cooperation of the government 
with the Islamic communities and 
the Federation of Imams and Schol-
ars in highlighting Senegal efforts 
in countering terrorism, and calling 
the scholars to renew their speeches 
to address the deviant ideologies of 
extremism, and to care for their chil-
dren and reform them.
One of the strategies adopted by Sen-
egal to combat such an imminent 
danger is providing the Senegalese 
police forces with training sessions 
within the framework of a program 
supported by the United States to 
combat extremist groups in the re-
gion, in which American trainers 
provided tactical training for Senega-
lese security officers and policemen. 
These exercises further helped the 
Senegalese security authorities to 
deter and counter terrorism. Senegal 
participation in the US Department of 
State counterterrorism assistance 
program dates back to 1985.
 Foreign Strategies  
In the face of terrorist groups, Sen-
egal has adopted strategies of ideo-
logical, developmental and military 





by countries and have become a role 
model to follow. Senegal also partic-
ipates in all international seminars 
and meetings aimed at countering 
terrorism, while considering the rec-
ommendations developed. Senegal 
has recently participated in an inter-
national conference in Nouakchott for 
African scholars on the role of Islam 
in Africa: Tolerance and Moderation in 
the Face of Extremism and Fighting. 
Despite the increasingly growing 
challenges across Africa, Senegal 
has adopted the principle “African 
solutions to African problems”, as 
the best manner to address the Af-
rican crises, and to understand the 
peculiarities of African countries and 
peoples. Senegal early realization 
of the fact that Africa has become 
a springboard for armed groups 
contributed to its successful coun-
terterrorism strategy. Senegal has 
become fully aware of the terrorist 
activity of Al-Qaeda cells throughout 
Africa, realizing that such terrorist 
groups benefit from the poor border 
controls between African countries, 
the poor law and judicial institutions 
and the poor, as well as the exploita-
tion of the poor population and re-
ligious or ethnic bedrock to recruit 
such people. All of these clandestine 
plans were glaringly exposed by 
Senegal.
 International Tribute to Senegal 
Counterterrorism Efforts
France commended Senegal coun-
terterrorism efforts in the 5G Sa-
hel. The first elements of Operation 
Serval were deployed in Senegal 
because it was the first contribu-
tor to the peacekeeping mission in 
Mali. France considered that only 
the strict and permanent mobiliza-
tion of the actors in the region could 
repel the terrorist threat. During the 
visit of President of Senegal Macky 
Sall to France on July 12, 2017, the 
French President Emmanuel Ma-
cron praised the Senegalese ef-
forts. France still evinces its desire 
to enhance economic cooperation 
with Senegal, and hopes to contin-
ue working with the ECOWAS and to 
continue military and security coop-
eration with Senegal.
On the visit of US Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo to Senegal in February 
2020, he emphasized that the United 
States of America considers Senegal 
an essential ally in fighting terrorism.
The United Arab Emirates appre-
ciates the constructive efforts of 
Senegal through the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in support-
ing issues of Islam and Muslims, and 
to showcase the civilization of true 
Islam free from extremism and vio-
lence. There is close cooperation be-
tween the UAE and Senegal in tack-
ling terrorism, violence and groups 
that claim the lives of innocent 
people, and supporting the “Dakar 
Center for Security and Peace”. 
17
DRIVERS OF INTERNATIONAL 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
COOPERATION 
  DR. SALEH AL-SAAD MIQDADI
 STRATEGIC RESEARCHER FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR OF THE 
ARAB INTERIOR MINISTERS COUNCIL
Iternational cooperation in counterterrorism has become a spearhead par excellence, simply because terrorism per se is a global cross-border problem. The overriding importance of cooperation in counterterrorism is evident through international and regional treaties, conventions and agreements, along with many counterterrorism organizations and 
centers at all levels, such as the United Nations Center for Counterterrorism, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
and the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.
 Objectives of International Counter-
terrorism Cooperation 
International counterterrorism co-
operation aims to coordinate the 
efforts of security institutions in 
the local, regional and internation-
al arenas to curb and clamp down 
on terrorist crimes, while providing 
security information. This helps to 
shed light on the magnitude of ter-
rorist crimes and accordingly devel-
op counterterrorism strategies.
International cooperation contrib-
utes to laying the scientific founda-
tions for conducting research stud-
ies common across institutions and 
research centers, which helps to 
better develop the work progress 
and produce richer results at differ-
ent levels, while enhancing domes-
tic security and preserve security of 
borders and ports. More so, inter-
national cooperation also enhances 
the capacity of domestic security on 
the international scene, exposing 
the sources of criminal action and 
financing, before snowballing into 
the borders. It further contributes to 
making the security services work 
in tandem, exchanging liaison of-
ficers and experts.
 Avenues of International Counterter-
rorism Cooperation
International counterterrorism co-
operation requires a number of 
methods which enhance perfor-
mance, including:
1. Adopting a unified definition of terror-





2. Establishing an international in-
formation center to counter terror-
ism, develop methods of exchanging 
information, identify the character-
istics of terrorist crimes and mani-
festations and collect complete data 
on members of terrorist groups 
or suspects, structure of terrorist 
groups and their political ideolo-
gies, means of terrorist recruitment, 
training camps, sources of financing 
and types of ammunition and weap-
onry. The center should also analyze 
information, forecasting the goals 
of operations, promoting coopera-
tion between the data-specialized 
agencies in member states and en-
couraging the exchange of informa-
tion, which will increase the ability 
to penetrate terrorist organizations, 
in accordance with Resolution No. 
1373 of 2001 issued by the Security 
Council, and the Riyadh Declaration 
issued by the International Counter-
terrorism Conference in 2005.
3. Establishing a security data bank 
to monitor all data related to danger-
ous international terrorist groups, 
while providing reliable and confi-
dential information collection and be-
ing fully cognizant of and updated on 
everything related to terrorist activi-
ties.
4. Increasing coordination between 
the security services concerned in 
the member states, by increasing 
the number of liaison officers and 
facilitating their work methods.
5. Improving the skills of counterter-
rorism workers, scientifically, pro-
fessionally, and technically.
 Challenges of International Cooper-
ation
The international counterterrorism 
efforts and the efforts put in to dry 
up the sources of financing terrorism 
are enormous; however, there are a 
number of difficulties that hamper 
the progress, including:
1. The multitude of terrorist threats, 
as terrorist risks are becoming no-
toriously more onerous through the 
rapid movement between terrorist 
hot zones in the world, the emer-
gence of lone wolves, the multiplicity 
of methods used in their operations, 
the different means of communica-
tion and encryption techniques.
2. Mobility, which means that mem-
bers of terrorist and extremist 
groups can move easily, especially as 
they work within small cells and have 
sympathizers across some areas.
3. Ease of obtaining weapons, explo-
sives and funneling ammunitions, 
due to scientific and technical ad-
vances. In addition, terrorists have 
experts who train their agents in 
making and detonating explosive de-
vices, and posting their video footag-
es on the internet.
4. Trained and qualified leaders and 
technical experts, who work to pro-
mote the ideologies of the group, and 
the recruitment of new members. 
They also have competent experts 
who use social networking sites 
scientifically and psychologically to 
propagate their crimes and baseless 
objectives.
5. Correspondence and means of 
communication between terrorists 
are completely confidential, includ-
ing the security of their information 
and their operational plans; they 
choose for themselves aliases, nick-
names and anomalies.
6. Poor exchange of information and 
analyses between some agencies 
concerned with counterterrorism 
and terrorist financing.
7. The different methods of striking 
a balance between freedom and se-
curity, and the relative procedures 
adopted.
8. The problem of financing terror-
ism in that financing per se is the 
main artery for the sustainability 
of terrorist groups. Despite inter-
national counterterrorism efforts, 
there are still gaps in adhering to 
and implementing these standards 
accurately; terrorist groups have 
heavily relied on about three to six 
trillion dollars in recent years, main-
ly from oil, taxes, drug trafficking, 
ransom and the like.
9. The lack of a holistic international 
definition that prevents terrorism, 
which hampers many joint cooper-
ation agreements, due to the incon-
sistency of some national laws with 
regional and international agree-
ments to counterterrorism, in ad-
dition to the differences between 
countries in aspects of commitment 
to national security and sovereignty, 
collusion in treaty-based extradition 
of terrorists and poor implementa-
tion of mutual legal assistance or 
reciprocity.
10. The limited national strategies 
and plans to combat extremism 
and counter terrorism, as a result 
of insufficient funding necessary to 
implement associated national pro-
grams and plans, the lack of inter-
est in monitoring and assessing the 
programs of some strategies and the 
lack of competencies and expertise.
In conclusion, it is evidently clear 
that many countries lack the im-
plementation of national strategies 
to counterterrorism; they are still 
lagging behind and left not updat-
ed. One of the most important chal-
lenges facing international counter-
terrorism cooperation programs is 
that they do not work in concert. To 
achieve a solid and sound diagnosis 
and treatment of such challenges, 
it is necessary to base the develop-
ment of strategies on holistic applied 
research and identify the magnitude 
of terrorism. 
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The proliferation of information and communications technology, merged with the increasing amount of big data and interconnectivity, turns out to be a deadly combination when it comes to the threat of terrorism. Just like any industry that grows up with the new technologies, criminals and terrorists would certainly make use of the sophistication of the Internet, mobile gadgets and artificial intelligence in order to launch their terror-ist agenda. This is indeed the new challenges faced by the global community. Nah Liang Tuang of Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies reckons that this tech-
nological advancement is a two-edged sword : One edge for a defence, the other for an offence. Technologies like smart-
phone encryption, internet of things, and the ubiquity of computer networks in the military and vital public services create 
mixed outcomes such as facilitating defensive military mobilization while also incurring potential cyber-threats and cyber 
vulnerabilities. With this background, this short article aims to analyse the nature and scope of cyberterrorism and the 
latest development on the international initiative to provide legal countermeasures to this global security threat. Special 





 The Risk of Cyberterrorism
The threat of cyberterrorism is a re-
ality. In the Global Risks Report 2019 
issued by the World Economic Forum, 
a lethal combination of large-scale cy-
ber-attacks and a large-scale terrorist 
attack, representing geopolitical and 
technological risks respectively, con-
tinues to exist.  The report describes 
large-scale cyber-attacks or malware 
such as those attacks that cause large 
economic damages, geopolitical ten-
sions, or widespread loss of trust in 
the internet. Meanwhile, large-scale 
terrorist attacks mean those individu-
als or non-state groups with political 
or religious goals that aim to inflict 
large-scale human or material dam-
age to their target. 
A terrorist’s use of the internet may 
also have other debilitating impact. 
In the same WEF report, the risks of 
terrorist attack were found to have 
a link of threat with other risks such 
as critical information infrastructure 
breakdown and the risk of launching 
of weapons of mass destruction. This 
is true because today we live in an in-
terconnected world where more and 
more vital infrastructures are being 
digitized and relying on data infra-
structure. 
Furthermore, cyberterrorism be-
comes increasingly popular due to its 
ease and affordability. Terrorists do 
not have to get expensive conventional 
weapons and bring them to intended 
site physically. They are not restrict-
ed by time or space: attacks can be 
launched virtually from anywhere at 
any time. This fact is exaggerated by 
the superior level of anonymity offered 
by the computer networks and the In-
ternet that allows the terrorists to hide 
behind the veil of technology. The im-
pact can be huge, depending on what 
target is aimed at. The modus operandi 
is ranging from spreading logic bombs 
to Trojan horses, from worms to virus-
es, and from denial of services to net-
work intelligence, etc.
 Definition and Scope of Cyberterrorism
So, what is cyberterrorism? A comput-
er misuse that disrupts the non-es-
sential services is at most a costly nui-
sance and is not cyberterrorism.  But 
serious or continuous cyber-attacks 
against nation’s critical infrastructures 
such as those of medical services, key 
government agencies or the military 
bases can potentially undermine the 
resilience and reliability of the infor-
mation systems wholly or substantial-
ly, and may in turn coerce the public 
and cause fear and anxiety. 
Furnell and Warren (1999) define cy-
berterrorism as the use of cyberspace 
by terrorist groups, indicating a tran-
sition from traditional terrorism that 
depends on materialistic means to 
modern terrorism that relies more on 
invisible technologies.  In a narrow-
er sense, Lewis (2002) defines it as 
the use of computer network tools to 
shut down critical national infrastruc-
tures (such as energy, transportation, 
government operations) or to coerce 
or intimidate a government or civilian 
population. 
From the above definition, one can de-
scribe cyberterrorism in two catego-
ries: One is where the “cyber-threat” 
element is crucial, namely an attack 
that targets, interrupts or cripples 
cyber or computer systems, which in 
turn would cause fear so as to further 
propagate their initial political or ide-
ological agenda. This includes attacks 
to the military cyber-based systems 
or otherwise to a country’s critical in-
formation infrastructure. In short, the 
cyber system is made as the target of 
the attack (Figure 1).
The second category of cyberterrorism 
is where the cyber system is made as 
a medium of the attack. This is when 
the Internet or any information and 
communications systems (mobile 
gadget, IoT, Artifical intelligence, big 
data, encryption, robotic software, 
etc.) are utilized by terrorists for the 
purpose of planning, preparing and 
launching terrorist attacks. Grabosky 
(2007) describes how extensive infor-
Figure 1: Scope of Cyberterrorism Category 1 – Attack to the system
Computer vs Critca Information 
Infrastructure





• Debilitating impact: se-
curity, economy, social, 
government functions, law 
enforcement etc.
• Attack to computer data
• Attack to computer system
• Attack to digital communi-
cations
21
mation technology has been used:  as a 
means to facilitate terrorism, including 
the hacking for intelligence; encrypted 
terrorist communications via the web; 
propaganda, i.e. bypassing journalistic 
editing and government censorship; 
psychological warfare, by generating 
anomalous pattern of traffic, giving a 
false impression that an operation may 
be imminent; fund-raising and recruit-
ment; distant training, e.g. of attack 
technique and skills, training manual 
publication, weapon making manual 
(Figure 2).
In Malaysia, the emergence of this sec-
ond category of cyberterrorism activi-
ties has increased in the past decade. 
Prosecutions were brought under the 
country’s Penal Code. Provisions un-
der ss. 130C-130J enlist various acts 
that were committed in pursuance to 
terrorist acts, e.g. recruiting persons 
to be members of terrorist groups or 
to participate in terrorist acts; provid-
ing training and instruction to terrorist 
groups; receiving training from ter-
rorist groups and persons committing 
terrorist acts; inciting, promoting or 
soliciting property for the commission 
of terrorist acts; directing activities of 
terrorist groups; and soliciting or giv-
ing support to terrorist groups. 
 The International Initiatives to Ad-
dress Cyberterrorism
Needless to say, cyberterrorism is a 
global risk and a global problem which 
requires a global solution. The then 
United Nations Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon said that the Internet is 
a prime example of how terrorists can 
behave in a truly transnational way. 
In response, states need to think and 
function in an equally transnational 
manner. In line with this observation, 
despite local laws and policies on cy-
berterrorism, we need to respond to 
this global risk with a synergized mul-
tinational approach. In this work we 
would assess the initiatives taken at 
the international level to address the 
threat of terrorism.
In 2012, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in collab-
oration with the United Nations Coun-
ter-Terrorism Implementation Task 
Force, had released a working report 
relating to cyberterrorism.  The UN 
Agency recognizes that despite in-
ternational recognition of the threat 
posed by terrorists’ use of the Inter-
net in recent years, there is current-
ly still no universal instrument that 
specifically addresses this pervasive 
terrorist activity. Adding to the cause 
of concern is the fact that there is lim-
ited specialized training available on 
the legal and practical aspects of the 
investigation and prosecution of ter-
rorism cases involving the use of the 
Internet. Therefore, UNODC aims to 
develop resources on counter-terror-
ism and cybercrime for combating this 
evolving threat.
UNODC stresses that there are few 
factors necessary in outlining the 
global response of counter-terror-
ism measures, including: (1) Common 
policy and legislative frameworks; (2) 
Investigations and intelligence gath-
ering; (3) International cooperation; 
(4) Prosecution; and (5) Private sector 
cooperation. All these primary factors 
are nevertheless dependant on the 
common commitment among coun-
tries to address and counter terrorism 
threats both within and beyond their 
national borders. How much are we 
ready for that? The fact is, until today 
there is no general convention that 
specifically addresses cyberterror-
ism. 
 The Convention of Cybercrime
Expectation has prolonged on the Con-
vention of Cybercrime to fill the gap, 
though there is still much to do. When 
officially signed in 2001, the Conven-
tion itself was convened without cit-
ing terrorism offences as the scope 
of the treaty. It was initially meant to 
harmonize the domestic criminal sub-
stantive law elements of offences and 
connected provisions in the area of 
cyber-crime, such as offences to the 
confidentiality, integrity and availa-
bility of data. On top of that, the Con-
vention also aims at setting up a fast 
and effective regime of international 
co-operation on countering cyber-
crime.
In response to this, the Cybercrime 

















Convention Committee (T-CY) released 
in 2016 a guidance note relating to 
the cyberterrorism aspects by the 
Budapest Convention.  The document 
addresses how the articles of the 
Convention could apply to terrorism. 
Therefore T-CY declares that “the sub-
stantive crimes in the Convention may 
also be acts of terrorism as defined in 
applicable law”.  This additional note 
under the Convention is timely. In the 
wake of increasing threat of cyber-
terrorism, it is made clear that the 
cybercrimes set out in the Convention 
can indeed be perpetrated as acts of 
terrorism, to facilitate and support 
terrorism.
The Note further highlights that even 
though this Convention is not a trea-
ty that is focused specifically on ter-
rorism, it is however argued that the 
substantive crimes in the Convention 
may be carried out as acts of terror-
ism, to facilitate or support terrorism, 
including financially, or as preparato-
ry acts. In addition, the procedural and 
international mutual legal assistance 
tools in the Convention are available 
to terrorism and terrorism-related in-
vestigations and prosecutions.
For example, under the Convention, 
each Party shall adopt such legisla-
tive and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish the powers and 
procedures for the purpose of specif-
ic criminal investigations or pro-
ceedings. Furthermore, such powers 
and procedures apply not only to the 
specific cybercrime offences as men-
tioned in the Convention, but also to 
“other criminal offences committed by 
means of a computer system”.  There-
fore according to the 2016 Guidance 
Note, this would arguably extend the 
applicability of the Convention of Cy-
bercrime to any terrorism offence as 
long as it is perpetrated by means of a 
computer system. 
With this extension, one can argue that 
being a party to the Convention would 
help a country in addressing cyberter-
rorism in their own jurisdiction, noting 
that such country will be eligible to 
the mutual assistance and coopera-
tion between member countries. First, 
Parties (to the Convention) shall afford 
one another mutual assistance to the 
widest extent possible for the pur-
pose of investigations or proceedings 
concerning criminal offences related 
to computer systems and data, or for 
the collection of evidence in electronic 
form of a criminal offence. 
Secondly, it also means that Party 
to the Convention will obtain its fair 
share to the international cooperation. 
Accordingly, the parties shall co-op-
erate with each other to the widest 
extent possible for the purposes of 
investigations or proceedings con-
cerning criminal offences related to 
computer systems and data, or for 
the collection of evidence in electron-
ic form of a criminal offence.  And the 
Party would be allowed to get mutual 
assistance even in the absence of ap-
plicable international agreements be-
tween countries. 
 Conclusion
It is concluded here that Cyberterror-
ism is a new form of terrorist acts, 
often having a more debilitating im-
pact, but yet has been largely spared 
by many jurisdictions’ policy and leg-
islations. 
Cyberterrorism is a global risk that 
requires a global response. We need a 
common policy and legislative frame-
work setting minimum standard of 
laws and best practices. A concerted 
effort for information sharing and in-
telligence gathering is necessary. An 
international cooperation on investi-
gation and prosecution, as well as a 
public-private cooperation would be 
critical. 
One important global instrument at 
play is the Convention of Cybercrime, 
being the only international conven-
tion on matters relevant to cyberter-
rorism. Though the Convention does 
not specifically address cyberterror-
ism, yet it is worded in such a way as 
to extend it to the threats of terrorists, 
hence cyberterrorism offence. The 
best response still, would be to fur-
ther amend the Convention and insert 
more specific cyberterrorism offenc-
es. However, the biggest challenge is 
arguably on how to get more countries 
involved to make it a more global and 
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Terrorists and extremist groups use the internet for the promotion of their ideology, glorification of terrorist acts, recruitment, broadcasting of violent content, facilitating communication and training potential recruits with anonymity. Online social networks 
are also used to spread their propaganda, fear, panic, intimidating messaging and threats to the 
public. Law enforcement agencies all over the world usually monitor and supervise the content 
of materials and communications in the cyber world to ensure that they are not used for illegal 
purposes. Unfortunately, criminals and terrorists have managed to bypass the supervision of 
law enforcement agencies by resorting to the dark web. To effectively counter terrorism and 
combat the financing of terrorism, law enforcement agencies must ensure that their officers 
are fully familiar with the state-of-the-art technology, spearheaded by the dark web.
 Real Threat
The dark web can bypass censorship, su-
pervision and monitoring of law enforce-
ment agencies and can provide a higher 
level of anonymity to their users. Proper 
training and awareness campaigns are es-
sential to ensure that all law enforcement 
agencies are fully equipped with know-
how to handle the threats from the modern 
digital world – a real threat looming large. 
The emerging digital threats associated 
with the dark web, including cyberstalking, 
hacktivism, fraud, identity theft and attacks 
on critical infrastructure cannot be un-
derestimated. The dark web, alternatively 
known as the deep web, is part of the inter-
net that isn’t indexed by search engines and 
is inaccessible by normal internet brows-
ers. Since the materials on the deep web 
is not indexed, one should have the precise 
URL to access the page desired.





which the IP address of each com-
puter or gadget can be detected 
straight away, the dark web can pro-
vide a higher level of anonymity to 
the users as the IP address of each 
computer or gadget accessing the 
dark web will be scrambled by using 
special browsers and networks like 
“The Onion Routing” (TOR) project 
and the “Invisible Internet Project”. 
This special browser – TOR – was 
developed and funded by the United 
States Naval Research Laboratory in 
the 1990s as a tool for evading on-
line detection with roughly 60% of 
its funding coming from the State 
Department and the Department of 
Defence.
The dark web allows people to pur-
chase firearms, passports, driver’s 
licenses and ID cards, healthcare 
data, credit card and social security 
numbers and pornography at rela-
tive ease. Due to anonymity, the dark 
web is also used to purchase stolen 
subscription credentials, hacked 
Netflix accounts and illegal software. 
The dark web also offers various il-
legal services, including assassina-
tion and hacking.
A global online marketplace in the 
dark web called the Silk Road once 
attracted over 100,000 users who 
transacted over one million deals, 
estimated to be worth $1.2 billion in 
global sales from vendors located in 
more than ten countries around the 
world before it was closed down by 
the authorities.
 Flip Side
Not everything in the dark web is ille-
gal. The dark web is simply an online 
platform neither regulated nor con-
trolled. Since it provides anonymity, 
many people surfing the dark web 
feel that they can act with impunity 
because they will not be caught. 
There is a legitimate side for the 
dark web, as well. There are various 
social clubs available on the dark 
web, including chess club and social 
networks similar to Facebook. Anon-
ymous browsing also allows people 
in repressed countries to circumvent 
government censorship and avoid 
persecution for online activities and 
assist whistle-blowers who wish to 
disclose valuable information with-
out compromising their identity.
The dark web encryption technolo-
gy routes user data through a large 
number of intermediate servers, 
protecting user identity and pro-
viding anonymity. The transmitted 
information can be decrypted only 
by the next node (computer), which 
finally leads to the exit node. This 
makes it challenging to reproduce 
the node path as the information was 
encrypted layer to layer. Due to this 
advanced encryption, websites are 
unable to simply track and identify 
the IP address or GPS of their users, 
while users will not be able to track 
similar information about the host. 
 Confronting Threat
The general perception that the dark 
web provides complete anonymity 
is not entirely correct as technology 
exists to counter it. In a 2012 inves-
tigation entitled “Operation Torpedo,” 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) used a method called “Network 
Investigative Technique” to detect and 
identify the IP addresses of at least 
twenty-five individuals who have vis-
ited illegal websites on the dark web. 
To proceed with investigations re-
lating to the dark web in the United 
States, the FBI can use the Network 
Investigative Technique (NIT) but a 
warrant is required. The NIT warrant 
authorized the FBI to deploy the NIT, 
which consisted of computer code 
that, when deployed to a user com-
puter, caused such computer to send 
to a government computer its actual 
IP address.
One important question is whether ac-
cessing the dark web can be banned 
or not. The answer depends on the 
law of the country. In many countries, 
accessing the dark web, similar to 
accessing normal websites, is not il-
legal on its own. As mentioned before, 
similar to normal websites, the dark 
web also offers various legitimate 
services. However, accessing illegal 
websites that promote illegal servic-
es is contrary to law. This includes 
websites that offer illicit drugs, illegal 
services like hacking, malware and 
pornography. The law in most coun-
tries does not discriminate between 
the dark web and normal websites. 
Both are subjected to the same law 
although enforcement might be more 
challenging.
There are other challenges that share 
similar characteristics with the dark 
web. This includes Virtual Private 
Networks (VPN), proxy servers, anon-
ymous e-mail providers, and other 
web services that neither retain nor 
provide any identification information.
To address cyberterrorism threats, 
security agencies should always re-
main vigilant and provide adequate 
funding for staff, equipment, training, 
in addition to encouraging citizens to 
be alert and to report any suspicious 
behaviour.
It would also be very helpful if inter-
national coalitions such as the Islamic 
Military Counter Terrorism Coalition 
(IMCTC) can assist in developing a 
platform to coordinate such training 
and technology sharing for counter-
terrorism purposes in the future. 
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  Editorial Team
ver since of the 9/11 Attacks 2001, po-
litical and academic interest in terror-
ism has been still on the increase, as it 
has remarkably attracted the attention 
of most international and academic so-
cieties, across all the manifestations of terror-
ism, such as those associated with religion, or 
far-right or far-left extremists, or secessionist, 
ethnic or lone-wolf movements of terrorism. 
Therefore, it was not unexpected that the re-
search studies on terrorism have been prior-
itized in academic institutions, much focused on 
identifying the drivers of terrorist behavior.
To translate the efforts of IMCTC made to explain 
the causes of terrorism and counterterrorism 
methods, an initiative was implemented, includ-
ing three in-depth studies of three terrorist or-
ganizations: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIS) and Boko Haram. These 
research studies address the circumstances of 
the emergence of these groups, across the main 
active domains for each.
This initiative includes an in-depth study on “the 
causes of terrorism” drawn from the three case 
studies under consideration, as IMCTC strongly 
believes that identifying the factors and causes 
that drive to terrorism remains an impediment 
to developing remedies and efficient methods 
to develop counterterrorism holistic strategies. 
The study relies on the descriptive and analytical 
method to answer some of the most prominent 
research questions: What are the challenges to 
understanding the causes of terrorism? What 
are the psychological, personal, social, econom-
ic, political, historical, religious, ethnic, “media”, 
information and ideological reasons that account 
for adopting terrorist behavior?
E
CAUSES OF TERRORISM INITIATIVE







 Challenges to Understanding Caus-
es of Terrorism
The study explores a number of 
challenges to understanding the 
causes of terrorism, most notably 
the research-based need to ob-
serve individuals who have been 
involved in terrorist issues for a 
long time, to conduct interviews 
with such people continuously to 
obtain a closer look at their demo-
graphic, psychological and social 
conditions and to gain a deeper 
understanding of the drivers of 
their deviant behavior. This often 
goes against the keenness of au-
thorities to isolate and quarantine 
such individuals ideologically to 
confine their danger.
Among the challenges that the 
study highlights can be spelled 
out in a set of observations. The 
terrorist motives usually seem 
very specific, and they are inher-
ent in the nature of the conflict in 
which they are involved, and its 
close association with the social 
and political incubator. Therefore, 
the results of the research efforts 
made to understand the causes or 
drivers of terrorism are often the 
inability to make generalizations 
of terrorism. The study turns the 
spotlight on the challenge of the 
absence of a global agreement on 
the definition of terrorism, which 
is due largely to the difference in 
the perception of each community 
to the concept of terrorism, in ad-
dition to the variation in the impact 
of international political and eco-
nomic changes to terrorism.
 Causes and Catalysts of Terrorism
In the light of the case study of Al-Qa-
eda, ISIS, and Boko Haram, the 
study examines the psychological 
causes and personal motives that 
drive such terrorists to commit 
their crimes, reaching a conclu-
sion that the psychological struc-
ture of the individual is important 
in his or her interaction with his 
or her community. In addition, the 
physical and mental development 
and the troubled reaction along 
with the improper social milieu 
have a direct relationship to any 
terrorist act. In the context of 
these reasons, the study discuss-
es the factors of searching for a 
life of adventure, excitement and 
new experience, loss of identity, 
addressing criminal tendency and 
a desire for revenge, and the emo-
tional propitiation that terrorist 
groups resort to in their polariza-
tion-driven propaganda.
The study also discusses social 
factors, the importance of the en-
vironment and social incubators in 
attracting youth to terrorist move-
ments, and the poor systems and 
curricula of education that lead 
to the emergence of personal and 
psychological imbalances. Like-
wise, the impact of economic rea-
sons reveals that economic suffi-
ciency is one of the main factors in 
bringing about psychological sta-
bility for the individual. Instability 
coupled with dissatisfaction most 
often generate a negative feeling 
towards society, and encourages 
the rejection of a sense of national 
responsibility, harboring a desire 
for revenge across some terror-
ist groups, thereby decoying such 
individuals with the ability of such 
terrorist groups to improve his or 
her economic situation.
As for the political causes, the 
study revisits the opinion of some 
researchers who believe that po-
litical factors or grievances are 
of great importance and contrib-
ute to the paths leading to ter-
rorism, mostly an instrument for 
mobilizing individuals rather than 
personal suffering that rises to 
be the direct cause of adopting 
terrorist behavior. The study also 
discusses the issue of exploiting 
the political and security vacuum. 
Terrorist groups take advantage 
of the political and security vacu-
um, the impact of which has been 
glaringly notorious on some coun-
tries across the region. Multilat-
eral warfare, military chaos, the 
absence of law and order and the 
difficulty of political solutions have 
contributed to finding an incubator 
stoking and fueling the spread of 
terrorist groups.
The study also highlights me-
dia-driven causes, as the early 
twentieth century witnessed a 
major development in the meth-
ods of planning and implementing 
terrorist attacks, as a result of the 
development of the capabilities of 
terrorist groups to keep pace with 
technical progress in communica-
tions. Among the most notorious 
outcomes is that terrorist groups 
have become cross-border and 
cross-cultural, and can infiltrate 
into minds, ideas and beliefs, 
spearheaded by the internet and 
its applications.
Finally, the study discusses his-
torical, religious, and ethnic “ra-
cial” factors that may be one of the 
leading causes to terrorist act and 
revenge. The study cites a set of 
revealing and telling examples of 
the three terrorist groups: Al-Qae-
da, ISIS and Boko Haram. 
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WOMEN IN ISIS DISCOURSE
Snowballing into existence, ISIS has thrown many politicians, military and security men along with research-ers off balance. Over a short period of time, ISIS lured many supporters, advocates and fighters, both men and women, into its labyrinth. It is not a new practice that women are involved in extremist and terrorist groups, nor is it exclusive to ISIS. History provides telling examples of women accomplices to terrorist acts, managing the clandestine affairs of terrorist groups, and not merely promoting extremist ideologies or pro-viding a social incubator for extremism.
In “les amazones de la terreur”, Fanny Bugnon spells out the tasks of women in terrorist groups, such as the Red Army in 
Germany, which is a left-wing group that adopted armed violence in its protests and caused what was called the “German 
Fall”. In 2017, Horst Seehofer, German Minister of the Interior, stated that the Red Army group was akin to ISIS, both groups 
attempt to undermine the bedrock of society and terrorize all communities.





 Typology of Terrorist Women 
Fanny revealed the typological 
patterns of terrorist women as-
sociated with ISIS, indicating that 
some women joined ISIS because 
of their affectionate attachment to 
a man in ISIS; while other women 
joined ISIS due to a real propensity 
to violence and revenge; still other 
women were fooled and deceived 
by wiles, myths and ruses of fe-
male combatants and fighters, as 
is the case in Greek mythology of 
the Amazon Fighting Women.
ISIS stands out from the rest in 
that ISIS women are on the in-
crease, albeit its aggressive dis-
course against women, nefariously 
full of all-out offences and grave 
insults hurled against women! 
Proverbially, out of the frying pan 
into the fire: ISIS returning wom-
en also report sexual harassment, 
exploitation of foreign women and 
forced marriage whenever the 
husband is killed, on the pretext 
that it is prohibited for a woman to 
stay inside ISIS without marriage. 
To add insult to injury until, fre-
quent accounts reveal that certain 
husbands are either imprisoned, 
made absent or sent away to blow 
themselves up as to confine their 
wives for their own personal in-
terests. luring and enticing women 
from different countries has been 
mouth-watering, so to speak, for 
ISIS to bring in more of them. One 
notorious practice is using wom-
en in the so-called “marriage of 
jihad”. ISIS hortative speech dic-
tates a variety of tasks to women; 
a woman is a partner, organizer, 
preacher and entertainer of fight-
ers in jihad”. On the flip side, wom-
an is captive prisoner captured at 
war, enslaved for ISIS men, who 
can trade women in. It is a speech 
that fuses pragmatic honoring and 
utilitarian object.
Women are also focal to ISIS doc-
trinal discourse, which adopts a 
number of ideologies, including the 
necessity of a woman covering her 
face, even though the issue is de-
batable and is not part of Islamic 
creed. ISIS ideology prohibits all 
that induces evil and vice, such 
as satellite, and women must – by 
religious laws – cover their faces, 
and must avoid all adornments 
and mingling with others; wom-
en must seek and display chastity 
and purity, as revealed by Allah Al-
mighty: “Those who love to spread 
evil in those who believe shall have 
a painful punishment in this world 
and the hereafter, and Allah knows 
and you do not know”. Your brother 
Abu Omar Al-Husseini Al-Qurashi. 
The ISIS practice, however, flouts 
the principle of decency and chas-
tity driven by one’s whims and 
needs. The publication of (Clouts 
of Monotheists) show women with 
their faces uncovered involved in 
the fighting. This is purposefully 
meant to gain support and evoke 
feelings to recruit new female 
sympathizers. In addition, with fe-
male fighters publicly displayed, 
this shows that ISIS is glaringly 
facing a real crisis of the lack of 
male fighters in the battlefield over 
the recent stages. As such, this is 
another violation against what ISIS 
has previously announced in one 
of its publications; Sharia does not 
dictate that women be involved 
in jihad. Under no circumstances 
shall women be taken to the bat-
tlefield according to the laws of 
ISIS for fear of being taken cap-
tive. Such a practice emphasizes 
that ISIS does not mind going too 
soft with the chastity and decen-
cy of women, hence to use them 
to serve and defend ISIS goals no 
matter what!
ISIS calls for women to cover their 
entire bodies out of chastity; iron-
ically enough, however, ISIS does 
not mind using woman on the 
pretext of serving ISIS men and 
heroes! For instance, “Al-Sham-
ikha Magazine” serves as one plat-
form of many others dedicated to 
developing ISIS speech; the term 
“Al-Shamikha” per se connotes 
and conveys feelings cloaked in fe-
male glory, ostentation, allure and 
bombastic speech that features 
ISIS prig women as decoys.
 Models of Prigs
As quoted in Al-Shamikha Maga-
zine (Issue No. 1, 1432), the wife 
of a mujahid who was killed in one 
of the ISIS battles provides an ac-
count of jihad and the family life 
of the mujahid wife. The purpose 
of this narrative seeks to moti-
vate the ISIS women to encourage 
their husbands to fight with much 
cohesion and patience, because 
the woman is primarily entrust-
ed and tasked with enthusing and 
enhancing the men’s willpower to 
seek martyrdom. The editorial of 
Al-Shamikha Magazine highlights 
the following: 
“Since women make up half of so-
ciety; rather, they make up all soci-
ety by giving birth to the other half, 
enemies are keen to keep women 
away from the truth of their re-
ligion and the truth of their role, 
because they know how good it 
will be if a woman enters the field! 
Islam needs women to define their 
religion, determine the reality, size 
and purpose of the battle. The time 
of negligence, simplicity and naive-
ty has seen better days! It is time 
for the lofty women to contribute to 
29
building the glory of the nation. To-
day, the Muslim woman is the edu-
cator of the next generation”.
No one argues that a woman is 
half of society; woman is the bed-
rock of society, simply because she 
is the incubator of values and the 
purity of faith, when well-educated 
on Islamic values. However, the in-
dication of the ISIS text raises the 
value of the woman, if she is “lofty”, 
“overbearing”, “prig” and actually 
involved in “ISIS sedition” and glar-
ingly supportive of subversion, rab-
ble-making and agitation.” In this 
context, Um Muhannad, a woman 
who lost her husband in one of 
the ISIS battles, remarks: “After 
marriage, I told my husband that 
everything I called for was of your 
qualities such as good manners, 
commitment, and knowledge, and 
I found all these qualities, except 
for one thing (and I meant jihad by 
oneself), then he – rest in peace – 
replied: So, keep praying until all 
your prayers are answered.” For 
an ISIS woman, an ideal man is 
only so when fully engaged in fight-
ing. The woman in Um Muhannad 
speech is not the one who asks her 
husband for jewelry, dresses and 
adornments; rather, she is the one 
who calls her husband to spend his 
income to support jihad in Afghani-
stan and Chechnya.
 War Prisoners or Prostitutes?”
ISIS propaganda has been intense-
ly increased as women increas-
ingly joined ISIS through different 
means, especially the internet, and 
direct recruitment. In the same is-
sue of the Magazine, Um Ghadeer 
explains the mode of life – beyond 
compare – in marriage to a muja-
hid, saying: “My sisters, life with a 
mujahid is not like any life, it is the 
bliss that leads, Allah willing, to the 
bliss of the hereafter. In your life with 
a mujahid, you will feel the joy of giv-
ing and obedience, you will know the 
meaning of life for the sake of princi-
ple, cause and struggle.”
The feminist affiliation of ISIS and 
the departure to the countries of 
the so-called caliphate cannot be 
traced back and ascribed to the 
lure and appeal of the ISIS dis-
course, which manipulates reli-
gious concepts alone, while reject-
ing contemporary life shrouded in 
injustice, exploitation and laxity of 
morals, as well as lack masculin-
ity, virility and manhood; rather, it 
has personal reasons that can be 
drawn from the speeches of the 
ISIS women. It can be observed that 
the reasons for women in the Arab 
world to join ISIS are not necessar-
ily those of the women in the west, 
as there is a group of ISIS affiliates 
who dream of acquiring the “honor 
of defending the nation” and affili-
ation with the “surviving division”.
Fatihah Al-Hassani known as Um 
Adam Al-Majati, is a telling exam-
ple of such ISIS speeches; she was 
honored by the ISIS in 2015, and is 
proud of joining ISIS and the House 
of Caliphate and Immigration. Dr. 
Iman bint Mustafa Al-Bagha, senior 
jurisprudent of Islam from Syria, 
is a really bewildering model. She 
joined ISIS; her son was killed in 
one of the ISIS battles; she married 
her two daughters to ISIS fighters; 
she encouraged mothers to follow 
suit while still immature and not yet 
nubile; she even defended the le-
gitimacy of ISIS, describing it as the 
land of the so-called caliphate, and 
posted on Facebook: “After looking 
into the tragedies of Muslims, the 
biography of the Messenger of Al-
lah, peace be upon him, the life of 





contemporary history, and juris-
prudence of jihad, I discovered that 
I adopted the ISIS-based approach; 
I am ISIS before ISIS was estab-
lished, and I know from that time 
that there is no viable solution for 
Muslims except in conducting jihad.
One example of ISIS women is 
Hayat Boumediene, whose motives 
to join ISIS were mixed with her 
love for Amedy Coulibaly, who was 
a hostage-taker in a Jewish store. 
One more representation lies in the 
wild desire to wipe out the profane 
past, cleanse the present from ab-
surdity and dissolute life through 
“ISIS repentance” and present one-
self as a sacrifice to ISIS. As such, 
many women have joined ISIS or 
provided ISIS with distant or on-
line services in to rest assured that 
much of their futile and immoral 
life is now over! While other women 
deliver speeches couched in virili-
ty, masculinity, manhood, brilliancy 
of Muslims and bravery skills, at a 
time when real masculinity almost 
disappears.
Ironically enough, ISIS women jus-
tify and rationalize in their speech-
es that ISIS men shall have the 
right to exploit ISIS women, enjoy 
them and trade in their freedom. 
A telling example is Um Somaya 
Al-Muhajira, who published an ar-
ticle entitled “Prisoners or Prosti-
tutes?” in “Dabiq Magazine” (Issue 
No. 9, 1436), Um Somaya argues: 
“Yes, Allah has empowered his 
guardians across the world, so they 
conquered and took control of the 
hometowns, killing the non-Muslim 
warriors, captured their women as 
war captives and enslaved wom-
en and children. I am extreme-
ly proud of such actions while I 
am documenting it in history. It is 
downright infidelity and disbelief! 
It is all shame! It is true that we 
staged daring raids on the infidel 
and disbelieving women, capturing 
them as captive prisoners of war 
and forced them to trudge all the 
way long by sword and shepherded 
and penned them up very much like 
sheep. Pride, glory and dignity are all 
due to Allah, His Messenger and true 
believers, while hypocrites know 
nothing whatsoever! She empha-
sized that this is a caliphate-based 
approach of prophecy and not a joke. 
ISIS has produced ISIS flogging and 
whipping women, ISIS-style preach-
ers, spies and vigilantes to violate 
the privacy of people.
The ISIS narratives issued by the 
ISIS men and women undoubtedly 
yet dangerously veer off the Sharia 
of Islam that upholds dignity, reli-
gion, soul, mind and money. Driven 
by its terrorist acts, ISIS has not yet 
recognized the dire consequences 
of such deviation, the most notori-
ous of which is ruining and tarnish-
ing the image of Islam, while also 
enabling the enemies of Islam to 
hold Muslims up to ridicule, and ac-
cusing them of brutality and barba-
rism. Therefore, Islamic communi-
ties had better develop integrated 
systems that enable and empower 
women to foster public awareness 







Once again, it is Islamophobia that triggers increasingly massive waves of hate across Europe, US, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand for Muslims and their beliefs, attracting the attention of analysts and politicians. 
The number of attacks on Muslims performing rituals in these countries is on the increase, including the 
shooting of Muslims while praying in mosques, or simply attacking anyone thought of to be part of the Muslim 
community. Such attacks often occur on the street or on transportation means, by using verbal abuse and 
calling Muslims names in public places, and on social media platforms.
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 Indicators of Increase
In terms of verbal attacks and 
threats across networks, official in-
dicators confirm the increase since 
2017 to date. These statistics are 
issued by associations to closely ob-
serve Islamophobia in Europe, such 
as “Citizenship Observatory against 
Islamophobia”. Most of such inci-
dents in Spain occur in the virtual 
world, at an average rate of 70%. A 
British organization has recorded a 
steady increase of 26% annually as 
reported between 2016 and 2017.
Such figures did not differ signifi-
cantly from their counterparts in 
France, as the National Assembly 
against Islamophobia recorded a 
steadily growing increase, as it is 
deeply ingrained in specific social 
circles, with several terrorist at-
tacks adopted by jihadist groups 
across several major European cit-
ies, such as Paris, London and Man-
chester, gaining wider media ech-
oes. In Britain, the Islamic Council 
has warned that representatives of 
political parties outside the far-right 
circles stoke up hate fraught with 
Islamophobia. The Council has doc-
umented 300 Islamophobic cases, 
which reveal that Islamophobia is 
rampant across the British political 
elite.
It is reported that Islamophobia is 
not associated only with a group of 
British politicians; rather, it has also 
become a case for European lead-
ers distancing themselves from the 
far-right. It is, of course, a strategy 
shrewdly instrumentalized by all 
European far-right powers, which 
have made remarkable progress in 
voting entitlements. 
 Dangerous Pandemic
One of the dangerous notorieties for 
Islamophobia is that it is no longer 
confined to some politicians or or-
dinary citizens; rather, it has ubiq-
uitously extended to schools and 
universities, as a spate of offensive 
comments are made by many pro-
fessors; Muslim students are badly 
treated given infamous Islamopho-
bia. In the United Kingdom, an ele-
mentary school teacher was fired 
after describing Islam as “world 
cancer” and “malignant religion” 
on networks, and the teacher en-
couraged his students to share his 
extremist views! These telling ex-
amples are just the tip of the iceberg 
of implacable and downright enmity 
towards Muslim communities.
No doubt that the series of terror-
ist attacks carried out in a number 
of Western capitals over the recent 
five years has fueled the spreading 
of hate among specific groups of Eu-
ropeans; however, there are many 
factors that have nothing to do with 





Islam and Muslims, spearheaded by 
the inability of the European authori-
ties to develop a cogent speech, help 
Muslims to restore their honor and 
to stave off strong-minded jihadists. 
Regrettably enough, the government 
policies often inadvertently spread 
Islamophobia, after insisting on the 
use of terms such as “Islamic”, “ex-
tremist Muslims” and “Islamic mili-
tancy”, associating such terms with 
counterterrorism.
Such speeches included statements 
and slogans that were initially de-
veloped by parties close to stubborn 
far-right groups, such as “Islamofas-
cism”, a term that some of them use 
to refer to dictatorial jihadist groups. 
Strangely enough, such western 
terms attach negative overtones to 
everything coming from the east. It 
should be also noted that “fascist” 
turned into a term with various con-
notations that go beyond the ideolog-
ical level.
These movements, which attracted 
followers from the left due to their 
speech calling for the protection of 
freedom, feed on the heinous acts 
of extremist groups that describe 
themselves as “Islamic”, especially 
the bombings in western cities, and 
the killing of western hostages in 
Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, leading 
to a sympathetic relationship be-
tween advocates of Islamophobia 
and jihadist extremism, as they cata-
lyze each other. The reference to the 
concept of advocating freedom.
Field research studies carried out 
in Germany, France and Britain have 
revealed that the democratic legit-
imacy attributed to these societies 
claiming their right to criticize Islam 
as “a dogmatic system that does not 
respect diversity and the values of 
civilization” makes it permissible to 
be financed and supported for their 
activities. Here lies the great fail-
ure of governments, official institu-
tions and civil society in general, as 
they failed in ending the speech that 
criminalizes Islam criminalization; 
they all failed to develop a speech 
that seeks to distinguish between 
Islam and Muslims on the one hand, 
and religious extremism and jihad-
ists on the other. 
 Image of Muslim Women
There is an explicit focus on anti-Is-
lam speech manifested in the im-
age of Muslim women. More so, the 
authorities concerned with observ-
ing manifestations of hate towards 
Muslims allude to diagnosing such 
hostile views towards Muslim wom-
en, especially veiled women, who 
are easily distinguished from other 
women. Anti-Islamophobic societies 
affirm in many western countries 
that three physical or verbal attacks 
out of four against Muslim commu-
nities is directed at women. This is 
also seen in other countries, such as 
Australia.
Far-right organizations are con-
stantly working to distort the image 
of the veiled woman as a woman 
who denies her femininity, succumb-
ing to the veil and surrendering 
helplessly to male power. In Spain 
and other European countries, many 
telling cases, mostly by young peo-
ple, attacking Muslim girls on public 
transport have been recorded, and 
such attackers often post pics and 
their acts on the internet. Far-right 
organizations employ attacking 
veiled women and demonize the Is-
lamic threat. In France, for instance, 
the police force a number of Muslim 
women to take off their headscarves 
at airports for security reasons. 
Far-right propaganda considers the 
headscarf the most pressing issue, 
especially in France, where it is an 
ongoing debate. The irony is that the 
tendency to accept these harass-
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ments against veiled women is clear 
to far-right organizations that justify 
them on the pretext of citizens fear-
ing the expansion of “Islamization” 
in their societies, and of the danger 
of Europe becoming an Islamic con-
tinent.
Here, we need to highlight the con-
cept of democratic rights and free-
dom of expression in the speech of 
the far-right, which happily prohibits 
any statement that offends supreme 
and sublime values, such as the uni-
ty of the country, respect for national 
rituals, and Christian values, but it is 
indifferent, slack and sluggish if the 
victim is a ritual or personality relat-
ed to Islam. For instance, a support 
campaign was held by the National 
Front in defense of a French girl who 
filmed a video clip to insult and of-
fend Islam. Shockingly enough, the 
National Front supported the girl’s 
right to insult Islam, but it does not 
show the same flexibility if the insult 
would be hurled at Christianity!
 Expansion of Far-Right
The far-right parties start from a 
racist ideology par excellence, and if 
they strive to embellish their ideolo-
gy with a constructive speech, they 
are basically based on a deceptive 
concept of citizenship. It stresses 
the “Muslim Enemy” as an object 
which manifests the negative over-
tones of all non-western societies. 
Such parties were able to create the 
appropriate turbulent political and 
social climate, to the extent that the 
European Council Against Discrim-
ination and Intolerance affirmed in 
its 2019 Annual Report that Europe 
is facing a shocking reality, which is 
the increase in attacks on Muslims in 
terms of quantity and quality; incite-
ment to abuse by insults and offenc-
es towards Islam and Muslims are 
based on online networking. The re-
port called for the concerted efforts 
of all European countries to combat 
the far-right and to agree on terms 
that do justice to Islam, and not to 
misunderstand Islam for extremism 
inherent in terrorist groups. Howev-
er, the missing link in these calls is 
that the far-right has assumed exec-
utive and legislative powers in many 
western countries. The disregard 
for the danger of Islamophobia has 
led to the classification of attacks 
on Muslims by individual incidents 
that do not express an ideological 
stream that has a presence in soci-
ety. The far-right extremist groups 
that have made significant progress 
in the elections claim that they do 
not break the law; rather, their con-
tinued interest in immigrants and 
Muslims and the link between them 
and criminality and covert or illegal 
immigration are very harmful to so-
cial cohesion.
 Instrumentalization of Corona Pandemic
It is glaringly evident that the Eu-
ropean and American far-right has 
been hunting in the murky waters of 
the “Corona Virus” pandemic, with a 
lot of talk about the possibilities of 
biological terrorism. Once again, the 
current global pandemic gave strong 
evidence of the convergence of ji-
hadist terrorism and racist far-right 
on an opportunistic endeavor, aimed 
at benefiting from a global crisis 
that has affected hundreds of thou-
sands of people and the collapse of 
the global economic system. While a 
number of jihadist and far-right so-
cieties have expressly declared their 
hope that the disease will spread in 
the enemy countries, there is a pal-
pable fear that the most criminal as-
sociations in the two camps have re-
sorted to developing viral weapons. 
At the beginning of the crisis, Matteo 
Salvini, former Italian Prime Minis-
ter and Leader of the National Front 
Elite, notorious for his harsh criticism 
of Islam, insisted on closing borders 
and tightening immigration policies, 
particularly in the face of Africans, 
despite the low rate of deaths in Af-
rica. Organizations in Austria and 
Switzerland have stressed that pre-
venting curfews and keeping them 
under surveillance is the best way 
to limit the spread of the pandemic. 
Meanwhile, Leader of the National 
Front, Marie Le Pen, soon launched 
a fierce campaign against the Euro-
pean Union, for failing to contain the 
pandemic and adopt a real immigra-
tion control policy. To make matters 
worse, Hungarian President Viktor 
Mihály Orbán, who considers himself 
far from the far-right, declares that 
Corona Virus cannot make us turn a 
blind eye to the fact that the immi-
gration per se, not the pandemic, is 
the main dilemma in Europe today! 
The leader of the Spanish “Vox” Par-
ty, Santiago Abascal, has indicated 
the necessity of restricting immigra-
tion, and called for the imposition of 
special fees on foreign immigrants. 
The far-right is taking advantage of 
any opportunities to reinforce its an-
ti-Muslim speech, and to create an 
environment favorable for harsher 
measures towards foreigners in Eu-
rope, while the groups readily willing 
to translate feelings of hate into ter-
rorist acts are increasingly growing. 
  Editorial Team
The whole gamut of American cinematography features scenes in which groups of men 
clad in white gowns and masks, very much like high fluffy hats covering the head and face 
with the eyes wide open, carrying burning crosses, wreaking havoc somewhere in a neigh-
borhood, often home to blacks, burning down homes and killing men, women and children, 
while committing wanton vandalism, turning the place upside down. These are not action or 
documentary scenes; rather, such scenes make up a true part of the practices of the oldest 
terrorist group in our contemporary world. It is the Ku Klux Klan (KKK).
KU KLUX KLAN






KKK derives its name from the 
Greek word kuklos, which means 
‘circle’, and from the English word 
clan, which means ‘tribe’. KKK was 
founded by six former officers in 
the US Confederate Army between 
December 1865 and August 1866 
to oppose the liberation of the 
blacks after the American Civil War. 
KKK notoriously committed much 
violence and terrorism, such as 
arson, battering, property destruc-
tion, killing, rape, flogging or whip-
ping members of the Federal Army, 
which was considered an occupi-
er after its victory in the Civil War, 
prompting US President Ulysses 
Grant to completely destroy KKK in 
the civil rights process in 1871.
KKK was eradicated for security 
purposes only, rather than ideolog-
ical purposes, so it soon regained 
more power. In 1915, William Jo-
seph Simmons brought KKK back 
to life in the Stone Mountains, 
Georgia. The second establish-
ment of KKK was better planned, 
as it became a formal organiza-
tion, consisting of a formal mem-
bership with a national structure, 
with local affiliates throughout the 
United States. Colonel Simon sent 
more than a thousand supporters 
and advocates to recruit mem-
bers into KKK. The terrorist or-
ganization reached its peak after 
a ten-year period of time, includ-
ing nearly 15% of the official total 
population of the United States, 
accounting for more than four mil-
lion members.
Social conditions in the early 
1920s were conducive for a mem-
bership campaign (KKK), especial-
ly in the southern states, where a 
third of the population moved into 
urban areas after they were in 
the countryside, and urbanization 
produced many changes, espe-
cially the spread of crime, which 
disturbed many conservative ru-
ral people. The booming oil cities 
produced vices and evils, such as 
prostitution and gambling, which 
were resented by religious people, 
who were targeted by the organi-
zation in its second establishment.
KKK acted and operated as a com-
munity guard and usurped the po-
lice function in various regions of 
the United States of America, so 
its members applied moral stand-
ards to members of community, 
flogging perpetrators, chasing 
criminals and collecting debts! 
More surprisingly, criminals used 
to be extradited to police officers 
who will administer punishment 
to such criminals! KKK targeted 
Jews, Catholics, social and racial 
minorities and denominations 
and persons who are accused by 
them of committing immoral acts 
such as adultery, usury, gambling, 
and alcohol abuse, and sought to 
re-establish Protestant Christian 
values in America.
The south was the real origin of 
KKK; however, its second numer-
ical strength was in the West and 
the Midwest, and its influence was 
greatest in California, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, and Louisiana, and it man-
aged to make governors and leg-
islators win the elections of these 
states. FBI documents record that 
John M. Parker, former Governor 
of Louisiana, solicited the federal 
government assistance to counter 
the terrorist activities of KKK in a 
memorandum dated September 
25, 1922, which he sent to the pub-
lic prosecutor, and he was unable 
to use any of the mail, telegraph, or 
telephone to send the message be-
cause of the KKK control, therefore, 
he managed to ask journalist Paul 
Wootton to do so as a mediator.
 Vulnerable Yet Persistent 
By time, KKK became weaker, its 
membership was glaringly be-
coming on the wane and its last 
affiliates were dissolved in 1944; 
however, it remained persistent 
as if imperishable, and it came 
to surface across some southern 
states in the 1960s, and it secretly 
committed a number of terrorist 
acts, such as bombings, shootings 
and flogging. Although the goals 
and actions of KKK go against the 
trajectory of history towards toler-
ance, diversity and acceptance of 
the other, that was not sufficient 
to defeat it; it remained alive de-
spite its divisions, the decline of 
the number of its members and its 
vulnerability. 
KKK is no longer a single entity 
run and managed by one single 
leader from central headquarters, 
as there are at least four main 
groups, operating today under 
KKK:
• The KKK National Knights Church: 
it was established in 1960, and 
now it operates from Indiana and is 
one of the most active KKK groups.
• The KKK Knights, also known as 
the Knights Party, was founded by 
David Duke in 1975 when he was 
25 years old, and its main office is 
headquartered in Harrison, Arkansas.
KKK usurped the police function 
in various regions of the United 
States of America, so its mem-
bers applied moral standards to 
members of community, flogging 
perpetrators, chasing criminals 
and collecting debts!
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June 21, 1964: 
Three civil rights 
workers were 
shot. 
November 3, 1979: 
Five protesters 
were shot in an 
anti-KKK protest in 
Greensboro, North 
Carolina.
April 1997: Four 
KKK members were 
arrested on charges 
of planning terrorist 
attacks in northern 
Texas, and were 
convicted of various 
charges.
May 6, 2010: Raymond 
Foster, leader of one 
of the KKK branches, 
was sentenced to life 
imprisonment for mur-
dering Cynthia Lynch 
for leaving the group.
April 13, 2014: Glen 
Cross Jr., former 
leader of KKK, killed 
three people in two 
Jewish centers 
near Kansas City, 
Missouri.
June 2015: Dylan 
Rove, supremacist, 
shot black leaders 
in South Carolina.
August 2005: Daniel 
James Schertz, member 
of the White Knights 
Group, admitted that 
he had prepared tube 
bombs to detonate buses 
transporting Haitian and 
Mexican workers from 
Tennessee to Florida.
• The BOK was founded in 1996 by 
“Dale Fox” and is exceptionally se-
cretive. It considers itself the sole 
heir of KKK, and is the only one to 
have a presence outside the Unit-
ed States (in Canada). It is believed 
that its headquarters are in Hen-
derson, Tennessee.
• The Imperial Klans of America 
was founded by Ron Edwards in 
Dawson Springs, Kentucky in 1996. 
It is believed to be the second larg-
est group in KKK, after the BOK.
KKK groups have returned to the 
limelight in the past few years. In 
2014, Fraser Glen Cross Jr. (ali-
as Miller), founder of the Carolina 
KKK Knights, was arrested for kill-
ing three people in the centers of 
the Jewish community in Kansas. 
These four groups include a large 
number of small factions, the num-
ber of which reached up to 160 
factions across 41 states, with two 
thirds in the states of the south, 
but in 2016 they decreased down 
to 130 factions, then to 51 factions 
in 2018.
 Financing and Recruitment
KKK raised millions of dollars to 
finance its social, media and ter-
rorist activities from its members, 
through membership fees, tax-
es and proceeds from the sale of 
products. Hence, the increase in 
membership fees was crucial for 
profit-taking, especially from those 
holding leadership positions in KKK. 
The group produced its own tools 
as a second source of revenue, so 
all its members were required to 
David Duke, American legislator, 
politician and former head of the 
KKK knights, remarks: “We expect 
non-whites living in America to 
act according to Christian princi-
ples; living under the authority of 
a white Christian government will 





purchase the KKK uniforms, which 
are smocks produced in its facto-
ries, and members are not allowed 
to design their own gowns.
As for supporters who do not seek 
full KKK membership, they make 
up an important source of fund-
ing, as this invisible army contrib-
uted to the financing of the group 
in millions of dollars, and each of 
them contributed about 25 to 100 
dollars. In September 2019, PayP-
al froze an account used to collect 
funds by KKK after receiving fre-
quent complaints. 
The organization employs modern 
technology, spearheaded by the 
internet and networking sites to 
recruit new members. KKK also 
exploits political events and ma-
jor attacks in media propaganda. 
In 2015, after Dylan Rove shot 
and killed nine African Americans 
in a church frequented by blacks 
in Charleston, South Carolina, the 
Knights Faction (White Knights) 
from KKK handed out leaflets that 
included the website and phone 
number of the platoon, accompa-
nied by bags of candy in the states 
of Alabama, California, Georgia, 
Kansas, and Mississippi, empha-
sizing in the publications that Dy-
lan decided to do what the Bible 
commanded him to! 
 Ideology and Identity
Like many organizations that pres-
ent themselves as fraternal ties, 
KKK has given its members a feel-
ing that they belong to something 
special, with its own and some-
times secret rituals in shaking 
hands, nicknames and encrypted 
or coded words, uniforms, pa-
rades, picnics, sport teams, en-
tertainment competitions, orches-
tras, concerts, parties, wedding 
ceremonies, funerals, baptizing 
and more. The organization has 
conducted campaigns for hun-
dreds of candidates for state or 
local level positions, and the 
Americans elected countless 
group members to be mayors, 
members of city councils and 
state and federal legislators.
On the ideological side, KKK has 
combined foreign xenophobia, 
religious extremism and racism 
with conservative ethics! In the 
midst of the global recession that 
followed the First World War, fear 
and anxiety spread widely among 
white Protestants over the future 
of the country they once knew 
and controlled. They were very 
concerned by the influx of im-
migrants from Eastern Europe, 
the increase in the influence of 
Catholics and Jews in American 
life, the immigration of African 
Americans from the South, the 
increasingly growing circle of 
political and sexual freedoms for 
women. In short, they saw crime 
and vice on the increase, and that 
the world was developing out of 
their control.
They believe that Christianity 
is their identity and their rai-
son d’être. Although many KKK 
members and groups have de-
clared that their Christian beliefs 
are the motive for their terrorist 
actions, we find that their use of 
Christianity was merely a cov-
er to legitimize their violence. 
Christianity is just a pretext, and 
they have no connection with 
valid Christian beliefs, texts or 
practices. This is typical of all 
extremist groups that practice 
violence in all religions. 
(KKK) has given its members a 
feeling that they belong to some-
thing special, which has its own 
rites of handshake, nicknames, 
coded words, uniforms, parades, 
picnics, sports teams, recreational 
competitions, bands, parties and 
wedding ceremonies, funerals, 
baptism and others.
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beyond a shadow of niggling and gnawing doubt, the IMCTC acts as a new international 
gathering to catalyze, coordinate and align the efforts made across the 41 Islamic Mem-
ber States under its overarching umbrella. Following its inception, the mandate which the 
IMCTC has been entrusted and tasked with over the recent period of time was limited to 
laying down institutionalization based on good governance, while also setting the tone for 
the ad hoc arrangements necessary to launch its actions and initiatives. This also included 
putting into action its focused domains with all the criteria ideally met and all require-
ments perfectly set in motion. Now comes out the launch favorably conducive for sustain-
able solutions, which are best showcased by the eradication of terrorism and extremism 
as horrendous phenomena through an ideological setting, informed media discourse and 
thoughtful cultural discussions.
The third issue of ALTAHALOF MAGAZINE comes out with a myriad of critically important 
topics on terrorism running through all its manifestations across the all continents that 
have been largely impacted by its dire consequences. The whole gamut of in-depth dis-
cussion was provided – thankfully – by a wealth of gifted, prolific, eminent and unbiased 
writers who have successfully provided down-to-earth views and fitting conclusions.
If terrorism per se is as old as the hills, it has notoriously snowballed and ballooned with its 
infamous methods, forms and tactics into new metamorphoses and mutations. To this end, 
the international efforts - each in its jurisdiction – are constantly made as the world has come 
to realize that no single power or country can be the only champion to eliminate terrorism.
Wide-ranging topics are brought into discussion and thematic diversity is highly featured 
in this issue supported by objective yet interesting viewpoints that further enrich the topics 
mooted for in-depth discussion. This is a special issue for terrorism in international law, 
incentives for international cooperation and legal remedies for terrorism and the possi-
ble implementation of Cybercrime Convention. The G5 Sahel that sustains this scourge is 
also highlighted in several articles. Again, if there are risible attempts to instrumentalize 
crises to spread hate through Islamophobia across Europe, the KU KLUX KLAN has been 
notoriously riddled and fraught with terrorism for 150 years, indicted on charges of arson, 
murder and vandalism against men, women and children. These are not dramatic or cin-
ematic scenes; rather, they represent a big portion of the heinous practices of the oldest 
terrorist group in our contemporary world.
Dear Reader,
The third issue of the Magazine is now brought to you at your fingertips, albeit still in its 
infancy. Your perceptive insights are highly appreciated! 
Colonel Hassan bin Suliman Al-Amri
TERRORISM: MANY AND 
DIFFERENT FACES
Third issue, M
ay 2020
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